Abstract

A well-developed and empirically supported theory of constitutional change hardly exists. There is no agreement on how to classify constitutional amendment procedures according to their rigidity, and not even an unambiguous and generally accepted way to measure the adjustment of constitutions. In this chapter, we focus on constitutional amendment procedures and try to substantiate these claims. This chapter is divided into two parts. We first review formal constitutional amendment procedures and the various mechanisms that can be used to increase the difficulty of the constitutional revision process. Thereafter, we consider other means through which constitutions can be changed, such as judicial interpretation, political adaptation by legislatures and executives, and alternative forms of irregular (or unconstitutional) change. We also consider the relationship between amendment procedures and the frequency of constitutional revisions cross-nationally, as well as the challenges involved in measuring procedural rigidity and constitutional changes. We conclude by arguing that one should be cautious enough not to overestimate the impact of procedural rules on the level of change. Amendment institutions at best provide only a partial explanation of constitutional change. The answer to this question must take into account a number of additional factors of a political, economic, and social nature.