Blog post published by presidential-power.com
Turkish parliamentary parties have joined forces in drafting a new basic law that should replace the 1982 military constitution. To this aim, a cross-party commission was set up in October 2011. The different visions that political parties have on the country’s new institutional structure have nevertheless led to political deadlock.
The process of constitutional reform has been at the forefront of Turkey’s political life since 2007, when the parliament’s failure to elect a new president triggered a snap general election. The ensuing electoral campaign led by PM Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) focused on the need to renew the country’s political institutions.
Following its re-election, AKP proposed a constitutional reform package that included the president’s direct election by the people. As the ruling party lacked the two-thirds majority required for the adoption of constitutional amendments by the parliament alone, the measures were submitted to referendum and approved in September 2007. The first direct presidential election will take place in 2014. Further constitutional changes were also approved by referendum in 2010. However, the drafting of a new constitution remained AK Party’s main project in the next electoral campaign.
Following the 2011 general election, AKP was only three seats short of the three-fifths majority needed for constitutional amendments to be submitted to referendum. To keep its electoral promise, co-operation with the opposition parties became essential. A Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (CRC), composed of three members from each parliamentary party, was thus set up in September 2011 to draft the new constitution.
The works of the CRC reached a stalemate in November 2012, when the four parties presented their reform proposals. Erdogan’s AKP advocates for the adoption of an “executive” presidency with the power to appoint and dismiss cabinet members, dissolve the assembly, and appoint ambassadors and senior officials without parliamentary approval. The other parties, however, are completely opposed to strengthening the president’s role. The opposition is more interested, for example, in reducing the current electoral threshold from ten to four percent.
Meanwhile, PM Erdogan’s legitimacy to insist for the adoption of a presidential system has been challenged by the authoritarian way in which he handled the Taksim Square protests and by his increasingly conservative social reforms.
As the four parties only managed to agree on 60 articles during two years of work, the CRC was on the verge of disbanding on 18 November 2013, when its president announced his decision to step down. However, the commission is not dissolved until its members officially withdraw their participation. More recent events may also have a chance of promoting inter-party agreement. The release of the CHP imprisoned deputies decided by the Constitutional Court on 4 December could bring the parties back to the negotiation table.
Whether or not the commission agrees on a constitutional draft has important implications for PM Erdogan’s political future. Internal party rules prevent him from running for another term as prime minister. However, if the AK Party’s proposal for a strong presidency is accepted by the commission, then PM Erdogan could contest the 2014 election and assume another important state role. This scenario is nevertheless far from certain, given that President Gul, who is more popular than the prime minister, has not ruled out the possibility of standing for re-election. On the other hand, if the parliamentary commission fails to agree on a constitutional draft, then the AKP’s plans for the adoption of a strong presidency will depend on whether or not it can win at least a three-fifths majority in the 2015 election.
